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“Judgment is concerned not with what is 
eternal and unchanging, nor with what 
comes into being, but with what someone 




0.  I am presenting this study for the first time.  Since it has not received critical 
scrutiny from colleagues, it is full of inconsistencies, inaccuracies and, of 
course, errors.  I would like to thank everyone in advance for their generous 
tolerance and eagerly await their comments, suggestions, objections and 
criticisms.  The way I have practiced philosophy over the years has led me to 
seek to assuage my afflictions and intellectual doubts as a means of achieving 
what the ancient skeptics called ataraxia – albeit momentary and provisional.  I 
often formulate questions which, in the end, are badly directed; I often follow 
argumentative pathways which lead nowhere.  For this reason, I require only a 
little light. 
  The theme of this presentation is the place and value of reflection in 
contemporary epistemology.  Reflection – understood as critical self-
examination – has been a recurring theme in philosophy and is almost always 
associated with the rational agent’s capacity for self-knowledge and self-
determination. 
  One of the reasons that the theme of reflection has become relevant in 
epistemology is the importance of the problem of the nature and possibility of 
epistemic justification or the states and conditions which might be required for 
a belief to be based on adequate grounds.  For some epistemologists, 
justification is associated with the reflective access that the person has to the 
content of their beliefs and the reasons these are based on, which provides 
them with guarantees to believe.  On the other hand, other epistemologists 
consider that epistemic justification relates to the natural-causal relationship, 
where the chain does not necessarily need to be reflectively accessible to the 
person.  This leads to a disagreement between the value of reflection: while 
some conceive that reflection is a necessary condition for the attribution of 
valuable epistemic states (such as knowledge, justified belief, understanding), 
others reject this. 
  Today, my aim is, on the one hand, to try to understand what is at play 
in this disagreement about the value of reflection and, on the other, to suggest a 





1. In this paper, I will assert that reflective performance produces something 
that is epistemically valuable.  My argument depends on us stepping back from 
the scenario in which the dispute about internalism and externalism about 
knowledge and justification have developed over recent decades, in order to 
begin to consider certain, so far little explored, skeptical dialectic scenarios. 
These are skeptical scenarios in which individuals are challenged to evaluate 
and judge whether or not their beliefs are justified.  As a rule, a person is 
presented with reasons to suspect the limitations of their subjective perspective 
about the evidence and reasons that dispose them to believe. In dialectical 
challenges between epistemic peers, both recognize that they are not in a better 
position than their interlocutor to believe. In this context, to continue the 
dialogue requires a critical reflective examination of their initial beliefs (with 
their evidence and reasons) and, in the end, the achievement of epistemic 
change: the person must improve, expand, deepen, better understand, 
guarantee, confirm, renounce, or suspend their judgment etc. In this sense, 
reflection is understood as a performance, an activity in which the person 
examines the evidence, content and reliability of their own beliefs.  This 
performance may lead to different results, but if someone is capable of critically 
reflecting on their own beliefs in skeptical-dialectic contexts, this is a positive 
thing, whatever the result – contrary to people who, in the face of skeptical 
challenges, simply decide to remain intellectually immobile, maintaining a 
cowardly, arrogant or dogmatic position.   
 I will not address this argument here1.  Instead, I merely intend to 
present the motivations of this argument.  This presentation is organized into 
three parts.  In the first part, I will provide a brief evaluation of the problem of 
reflection in present day epistemology; in the second, I will suggest a change of 
perspective, from an individualistic point of view, or one centered on a 
description of the subject’s properties, to a dialectical point view, centered on 
situations where requesting reasons really makes sense.  In the third part, I will 
provide a brief summary of the argument I developed in partnership with Felipe 
Rocha in the paper, “Disagreement and the value of reflection” (SILVA FILHO & 
ROCHA, 2016) and will argue that the critical spirit with which someone 
discusses opinions in the context of dialectical disagreement, submitting them 
to the scrutiny of reason (that is, to the arguments for or against), is virtuous 
and has epistemic value. The consequence of this performance, the epistemic 
preference, has a final value, since deliberations based on free judgment have 
final value. 
   
I. THE PLACE OF REFLECTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY  
2. Since the famous passage in which Socrates (PLATO 38a5-6) says that the 
unexamined, and therefore non-reflected, life is not worth living, “reflection” 
has been a diffuse and imprecise term that may acquire different meanings in 																																																								
1 This argument has been developed in Silva Filho & Rocha (2016). 
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ethics, moral philosophy, the philosophy of mind or political philosophy.  Two 
meanings of “reflection” are at the core of the current debate in epistemology: 
 
(R1) in a tradition initiated by J. Locke (1690, p.43), understanding arises 
from experience, with the mind’s perception of external objects or with 
the perception of the “operations of our own mind within us, as it is 
employed about the ideas it has got”.  Reflection is the act of 
understanding which enables the formation of ideas that cannot be 
directly obtained from external things through empirical experience.  
This category includes the acts of thinking, doubting, believing, 
reasoning, knowing;  
(R2) for many philosophers, reflection is conceived as a metacognitive 
performance which evaluates its own first-order doxastic states (beliefs, 
thoughts and desires) and forms second-order doxastic states.  In this 
sense, reflection is a deliberate operation of the mind which, when the 
subject becomes aware of their own content, they are empowered to 
judge their own states and believe and act in the light of this judgment. 
 
Both (R1) and (R2) may be contested, albeit from different angles.  As a human 
capacity, generally in a weak epistemic state, (R1) is not the object of great 
controversy.  H. Kornblith (2002, p. 103), a severe critic of the importance of 
reflection in epistemology, recognizes that reflecting on one’s own belief is 
characteristic of human life: 
 
“We sometimes wonder whether the beliefs we have are ones we ought to 
have. And we sometimes wonder about beliefs we might come to adopt, 
whether we ought to adopt them. More than this, such reflection does not 
seem, at least typically, to be an idle academic exercise.”  
 
(R1) is therefore important for the human experience, but is not a condition for 
the attribution of a more valuable epistemic state than epistemic states that fall 
short of reflection. 
  Meanwhile, while (R1) is not apparently problematic for epistemology, 
one of the consequences of (R2) is the idea that reflection plays an essential role, 
both in the formation of new beliefs (second-order beliefs) and in the formation 
of judgments about the reliability and safety of first-order beliefs.  For this 
reason, (R2) may also be described thus: 
 
(R2a) reflection is the process for the formation of second-order beliefs 
which, in turn, function as reasons (to believe and to act); 
(R2b) on reflecting, the individual assesses the reliability of their doxastic 
states, granting greater or lesser reliability to the process for the 




(R2c) reflection produces more valuable epistemic states than states that 
fall short of reflection. 
 
3. There is intense discussion in epistemology about (R2) and its corollaries, 
which has frequently been polarized into two strongly opposing theses: 
 
(PR) Pro-reflection: reflection is a necessary condition for the attribution 
of valuable epistemic states (such as knowledge, justified belief, 
understanding); 
(CR) Con-reflection: reflection is not necessary for the attribution of 
valuable epistemic states (such as knowledge, justified belief, 
understanding); 
 
It is possible to conceive of a third position: 
 
(IR) Irrelevance of reflection: the subject has the capacity to reflect on 
their epistemic states, however this does not affect the attribution of 
valuable epistemic states (such as knowledge, justified belief, 
understanding);  
 
Although (IR) is apparently encompassed by (CR), those who defend (CR) might 
say that, even if reflection is not required, there are cases in which one 
attributes valuable epistemic states (such as knowledge, justified belief, 
understanding) through reflection; this negates (IR), which, in turn, states that 
there are no cases in which the role of reflection is relevant.  Despite this, it is 
important for the argument to consider that both are ways of negating (PR)2. 
 
A) The epistemic significance of reflection 
4. What are philosophers asserting when they argue that reflection plays a 
relevant role in the attribution of cognitive states?  (PR) is a broad family of 
positions, but one can identify at least three groups of epistemic meanings for 
reflection: 
 
(K-reflection): reflection is required for the definition of knowledge; 
here, for example, is the notion of reflective knowledge found in E. Sosa 
(cf. SOSA, 2007; 2009). Typically human knowledge involves not only the 
																																																								
2 I would like to thank Felipe Rocha for alerting me to this point. 
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reliability of the process for the formation of true beliefs, but second-
order epistemic evaluation; 
(U-reflection): reflection is required for a broader form of epistemic state 
which involves coherence and the certification of the reliability of the 
process for the formation of the belief, namely, understanding, but this 
does not necessarily involve knowledge (cf. PRITCHARD, 2010; 2014; 
KVANVIG, 2003; 2014); 
(W-reflection): reflection is not relevant to epistemic states, only to 
moral ones and is linked to a state such as wisdom (cf. GRIMM, 2014; 
forthcoming). 
 
I will not discuss these points here3. This is only a general hypotheses about the 
place that reflection occupies in the current epistemological debate. 
 
B) Epistemic Agency 
5. Considering these various perspectives about reflection, it seems to me that 
the notion of epistemic agency is the one which best expresses disagreement 
between epistemologists.  We speak of epistemic agency when we conceive that 
an individual consciously stops to reflect and ask themselves what they should 
believe and do; having taken this step, they find themselves in a position that 
enables them to credit their beliefs and make them reliable.  When an 
individual stops to reflect – something that a dog is unable to do – they are 
transformed into an agent with respect to their doxastic states. 
  In these terms, unlike animals, we direct our attention to ourselves, to 
our own internal states and we become conscious of our intentions, desires, 
beliefs and attitudes and how these states were formed (cf. NAGEL, 1996, p. 200).  
Our capacity to direct our attention to our own mental activity is also a capacity 
to distance ourselves from these states and call them into question (cf. 
KORSGAARD, 1996, p. 93). Although we often act and form our beliefs without 
reflecting, in order to talk of knowledge and action in a relevant sense, 
reflection is essential. 
 
C) What’s the Matter? 
6. But what exactly is at play here?  In fact, the philosophical dispute about the 
epistemic value of reflection revolves around a family of arguments which, 
generally, include at least one of the following six aspects: 
 
i. The issue of epistemic accessibility: epistemic accessibility asserts that 
for a person to be epistemically justified in having a belief, it is not 
sufficient for this belief to be true (this is, in fact, necessary, but not 																																																								





sufficient); in addition, they must have awareness of the reasons that 
guarantee that this belief is true; 
ii. The issue of luminosity: luminosity refers to the requirement that an 
individual is not only able to know that p (first-order thought), but 
also – and mainly – to know that they know that p (second-order 
thought); 
iii.  The issue of the principle of epistemic responsibility: for many actors 
epistemic justification is the essential relationship between the 
individual and the consequences of their belief and, in this sense, 
accepting a belief in the absence of such reason is epistemologically 
irresponsible; 
iv. The issue of “over-intellectualization”: From an internalist 
perspective (which tends to over intellectualize our cognitive 
activities), knowledge attribution is rare (there are only a few cases of 
people knowing/finding out about something because they reflect, 
find reasons and justify their beliefs); 
v. The issue of epistemic voluntarism: when we reflect, our beliefs are 
typically formed by means of a decision and our knowledge of our 
own beliefs is explained by the fact that we decide what to believe in 
and not because of something that we discover about our minds; 
vi.  The skeptical issue of justification: if an individual sustains the belief 
that p and not the belief that ¬p, they must have a reason for this. If 
this individual declares that they have such a reason, then we may 
demand they present it and defend it against the three objections: 
infinite regress (where the reason refers to another reason which, in 
turn, refers to another reason, ad infinitum), vicious circularity 
(where this reason is sustained on a previously presented reason), and 
arbitrary assumption (where the reason is not sustained on anything). 
 
II. FROM AN INDIVIDUALISTIC POINT OF VIEW TO A DIALECTICAL ONE 
7. As I have already noted, this is an intense debate and here I am only 
presenting a simple overview to motivate my hypothesis.  Given the space 
restrictions of this presentation, what is important to highlight is that the 
family trait between the various positions is the centrality of (i) - the issue of 
accessibility, which is the most general aspect from which the others arise 
(PAPPAS, 2014, §§ 2-3).  
  At the beginning of “Prospects for epistemic compatibilism”, Sven 
Bernecker wrote (2006, p. 81) that if we want to determine “whether someone is 
justified in holding a certain belief or whether someone knows something, one 
must do so from some point of view”. Taking this into consideration, he 
presents an alternative:  
 
(i) “One can work from the point of view of the subject”. Philosophers 
who adopt this point of view to make their assessments are internalists. 
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Internalists “perform their epistemic evaluations from the first-person 
point of view, taking into account only that which is available to the 
subject at the given time”; 
or 
(ii) “[One can work] from the point of view of someone who knows all 
the relevant facts, some of which might not be available to the subject”. 
Philosophers who adopt this point of view to make their assessments are 
externalists. Externalists “evaluate from the point of view of a fully 
informed spectator”.  
 
Additional to these alternatives, the debate in epistemology is marked by 
attempts to find a “third way”, which reconciles “a” and “b”, what Bernecker 
(2006, pp. 83-86) calls epistemic compatibilism – which, for its part admits the 
externalist “truth-effective character of justification while accepting the 
[internalist] transparency of reason”. Bernecker’s main argument (2006) is “that 
Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to satisfactorily combine internalist and 
externalist features in a single theory” 4.  
 
8. In my opinion, despite their differences, internalism and externalism express 
something which Lammenranta (2011a) calls an individualistic perspective of 
justification.  These philosophical positions seek to understand and explain 
what the epistemic conditions are in relation to the individual subject: in an 
idealized scenario, what are the states and dispositions that the individual must 
or could have, what are the performances that the individual must or could 
enact for us to attribute knowledge?  This, obviously, restricts epistemic 
justifications to factors relating to the subject’s mental states (like the 
internalists) or the causal sources of these states (like the externalists).  For 
evidentialism, for example, justification is a function of the individual’s 
experiences; for reliabilism, it is a function of the causal origins of the 
individual’s beliefs. 
 In relation to the internalism/externalism debate, my thesis is that this is 
a false dispute, because it does not matter whether the agent only has true 
beliefs or whether they have beliefs justified by reasons [This is the problem, 
but this point needs to be further developed. A careful review of sources is 
required.  It is necessary to demonstrate that there is an important difference 
between an individualistic perspective and a dialogical/dialectic one.  Merely 
saying that one exists is not sufficient.] 
 
9. I argue for a change of perspective.  My proposal involves certain aspects of 
Virtue Epistemology, but I recommend taking a step that Sosa would not take. 
While Sosa’s virtue perspectivism establishes a distinction between levels (and 																																																								





not kinds) of knowledge, my proposal suggests a distinction between epistemic 
contexts/scenarios. Different contexts/scenarios establish different epistemic 
requirements. In skeptical dialectical scenarios5, people investigate whether or 
not their own beliefs, or those of their interlocutor, are justified, and whether or 
not their reasons are good reasons.  The general schemata is: 
(DSD) Disagreement Scenarios or Dialectical Disputes: about an object, 
happening, idea, concept - any f phenomenon 
 
(A)  J believes that a 
(B)  K believes that ¬a 
(C)  K challenges J to explain why J believes a and not ¬a 
(D)  J challenges K to explain why K believes ¬a and not a 
 
When only (A) and (B) occur, we imagine that both J and K refuse to continue 
the dialogue.  If we do not consider an idealized individual, whose rationalism 
requires them to remain in a permanent arena of consistent argument, their 
willingness to continue the dialogue is not only an epistemic requirement, but 
also a moral one.  We then imagine that, for some reason, the distinction 
between a and ¬a is relevant to both J and K; that for both J and K it is not a 
matter of indifference whether they believe a or ¬a, since this distinction affects 
the epistemic position of these individuals in relation to the world, themselves 
and other individuals. 
  I would note that in order to follow my reasoning, I am dealing with a 
disagreement from the perspective of a dialogue, which involves a second 
person. I believe that some of my results may be generalized to a perspective in 
which a subject disagrees with their past or future self, but, at this moment, I 
intend to remain neutral about this aspect.  Similarly, I will avoid the third 
person perspective, or that of the omniscient narrator. In the end, whether or 
not proposition a is true or false does not matter to me; what matters is that, 
having reflected, the person’s epistemic state will be virtuously attained. 
  At the outset, the interlocutors do not assume what the contemporary 
epistemology of disagreement calls the Position of Equality.  If J believes a and 
rejects ¬a (and K believes vice versa), they obviously think they are in a superior 
position.  It is necessary to show them, skeptically, that they are not in the 
superior position that they think they are in.  Following the dialogue is a 
skeptical requirement and the dialogue norms are imposed by the condition 
that J and K are rational, if fallible, agents.  For this reason, the fact that J and K 
start out with beliefs that they accept as the truth does not prevent them, at the 
outset, from attributing the condition of epistemic peer to their interlocutors 
and assuming the Principle of Humanity or the Principle of Charity.  As 																																																								
5 From this point onwards, I have brought together certain fragments from the Silva Filho & Rocha 
(2016) paper. 
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Davidson reminds us, this principle is the precondition for two people to be 
able to talk and disagree about something: in order for an individual to be able 
to understand the meaning of the utterances of the other, they must suppose 
that this individual is a rational being who formulates utterances with meaning, 
which are (in most cases) true (DAVIDSON, 1973). 
 
10. In the epistemology of disagreement, discussions frequently address 
idealized scenarios and involve hyper-rational beings who strictly obey the laws 
of classical logic.  Here, I restrict my considerations to epistemic disagreements 
from a Pyrrhonian perspective.  From this perspective, agents are fallible beings 
and have an incomplete understanding of cognitive content, only have access to 
a partial set of information and may be influenced by feelings and emotions.  In 
this sense, there are no perfect symmetries between J’s and K’s positions and 
their doxastic differences, it is difficult for the two subjects to have the same 
evidence – at most, they may only have similar evidence.  This does not 
compromise my argument, since even when they are not hyper-rational beings, 
it is not hard to imagine that two people might be sincerely interested in 
finding out the truth and might be sincerely self-critical. 
 
III. PREFERENCE AND THE VALUE OF REFLECTION  
11.  As a result of a rational disagreement, a person may believe, disbelieve, or 
suspend judgment.  These options are normatively established by the 
conditions required for them to be a rational being.  The person must remain 
convinced of those beliefs for which there are evidence and reasons; and they 
must renounce beliefs when they recognize that there is no evidence or reason; 
and, finally, they must suspend judgment about those beliefs for which both 
they and their interlocutor have reason, but not evidence, when there is no way 
to decide for or against believing. 
 If I accept this, there are at least three possibilities: 
 
(a) Even when we do not assume a stubborn or arrogant attitude, we can 
preserve our beliefs; 
(b) Even when we are not intellectual or moral cowards, we can change our 
opinion, forming a new belief, and 
(c) Even when we do not retreat to find better reasons, we can suspend 
judgment. 
 
Can we say that in (a), (b), or (c) we remain rational agents?  What justifies the 
notion of remaining (epistemically) rational in both preserving and renouncing 
our beliefs?  What makes our performance virtuous and the result of our 
activity finally valuable? 
  Carl Ginet (2001, 63) presents a situation in which one person judges 
that another “was not justified in coming to have a particular belief” because 




belief”. Everything leads to a belief that this judgment only makes sense because 
“[we] suppose that a person might come to believe something simply by 
deciding to do so”.  In the process of disagreement through critical reflection, 
the person does not form new knowledge or a new belief, but forms a virtuous 
attitude of judging and establishing an epistemic preference. 
 
12. Reflection is a performance that may provide different results.  Clearly, a 
critical reflective performance does not make people immune to error or false 
beliefs: to evaluate reasons and present justifications is no guarantee of truth 
and knowledge.  However, reflective work puts people in a position that 
deserves praise and credit: it avoids precipitation, arrogance, dogmatism and 
epistemic injustice. 
  If a person is capable of critically reflecting on their own beliefs as well 
as on the beliefs of interlocutors who have opposing beliefs, whatever the result, 
this appears to me to be something positive and valuable.  The critical spirit 
with which a person discusses opinions, subjecting themselves to the scrutiny 
of arguments for or against, is something virtuous.  The gain may be direct: 
when the person discards unsatisfactory reasons and finds guarantees to believe 
or disbelieve; but it may also be indirect: leading to a more demanding attitude, 
mistrustful of certain claims, while curiously, at the same time, becoming more 
capable of understanding positions different from their own. 
  This form of disagreement may be found in both daily life and in 
philosophy.  In daily life, in which practical decisions must be made, making a 
judgment following the exercise of reflection, such as that described, is a gain, 
even though the belief may be fallible, defensible, etc.  In the case of philosophy, 
whose object is categorically not based on evidence, the suspension of judgment 
may be a gain – even if people, including dogmatists, think that only justifying a 
belief is a gain and suspending judgment is a loss. 
